Good Advice from a Wise Judge

Texas law states that a family violence Protective Order can be granted when family violence has occurred and is likely to occur again in the future. Tex. Fam. Code § 81.001. In Gonzalez v. Galvan, No. 13-08-488-CV (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi Apr. 23, 2009).there was evidence of family violence, but the trial court denied a Protective Order because he did not think it would reoccur in the future. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed, quoting the trial judge's advice to the parties: "Separate, people. Get away from one another and knock it off before one of you ends up in prison because that's where this is going."

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Texas Legislature on Track to Repeal Economic Contribution

According to the Texas Family Law Foundation's newsletter, Senate Bill 866 has passed the Senate and been sent to the House. The House bill already had a committee hearing. The thought is that the Senate bill will be the one actually passed. For background see the North Texas Family Law Blog.

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Signing this Order Meant Participation and Agreement

A restricted appeal requires that the appellant did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the order being appealed. In this restricted appeal of an Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, the appellant claimed that merely signing the trial court's order did not constitute "participation." The First District Court of Appeals disagreed because the appellant "approved and consented to [the Order] as to both form and substance." The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the Interest of A.C.R., No. 04-08-00643-CV (Tex. App. - San Antonio Apr. 15, 2009).

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Guns, Drugs and Money Show Ability to Pay

We've previously blogged about inability to pay as a defense to a child support contempt citation. In In re: Corder, No. 01-09-00004-CV (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2009, orig. proceeding), an obligor claimed an inability to pay but was successfully impeached when a "Sheriff's Petition and Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture" was admitted into evidence. The Petition reflected that upon his recent arrest, the obligor had "$6,639 cash in his pocket and a Ruger .45 caliber pistol, a Marlin .22 caliber firearm, an Ultra High Powered .22 caliber rifle, multiple prescription drugs, and six baggies, believed to contain marijuana." This evidence, the First Court of Appeals dryly observed, "tended to discredit and to impeach his testimony that during the period in question, he was unable to obtain employment."

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Modification Requires Change of Circumstances

Texas law permits modification of a conservatorship order only if "the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed" since the previous order and modification would be in the child's best interest. The trial court modified a thirty-mile residency restriction by contracting it to the borders of two school districts when the mother wanted to move but the father testified that driving thirty miles to see the children would cut down on his possession time. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed because there had been no material and substantial change since the previous order. In the Interest of T.L.S., No. 02-08-238-CV (Tex. App. - Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2009).

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No Child Support Offset for Infomal Payments

The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected a father’s argument that pre-divorce payments to the mother should offset post-divorce child support because informal payments do not constitute child support. In addition, a divorce decree does not relieve one of child support obligations in temporary orders. In the Interest of R.F.G., No. 05-08-00285-CV (Tex. App. - Dallas Apr. 3, 2009).

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Short Deadlines When Appealing Termination

When the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services convinces a court to terminate parental rights, the appellate deadlines and procedures are, respectively, short and detailed. Because termination cases are accelerated appeals, a notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days of the day the order is signed. Further, a motion for new trial will not extend the appellate deadlines. In addition, as The Tyler Court of Appeals reminds in In the Interest of M.T., 290 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2009), the appealing parent must file a statement of points to be raised on appeal within fifteen days of the judgment under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.405.

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Splitting Up the Children on Divorce

"There is a long line of jurisprudence in Texas that supports keeping siblings together in the same household absent clear and compelling reasons for separating the children." In this case, the trial court "heard evidence that all three children were harmed by their mother's paranoid delusions and by her practice of speaking ill of the father in front of the children." Only one child was ready to begin reunification with the father. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing that child with the father and the other two children with the mother. Stoufflet v. Stoufflet, No. 03-08-00003-CV (Tex. App. - Austin Mar. 20, 2009).

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Two Deadlines Slipped By

Houston's First District dismissed an appeal in a modification case when the appellant did not request a de novo appeal of the associate judge's ruling, the district judge then adopted that ruling, and the appellant moved to void the associate judge's ruling more than thirty days later. To appeal an associate judge's ruling, one must request a de novo hearing, in writing, within three working days of receiving notice of the associate judge's decision. One must either appeal a case, or move for a new trial (or the like), within thirty days of the trial court's decision. Otherwise, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Colley v. Hickerson, No. 01-08-00154-CV (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 12, 2009).

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Motion to Transfer Venue Granted Despite Factual Dispute

The Amarillo court granted a petition for writ of mandamus to require transfer of venue in a modification suit. The majority held the trial court abused its discretion on undisputed facts. The dissent argued that the facts were disputed so that the trial court's decision must be respected. In re: Dozier, No. 07-08-0491-CV (Tex. App. - Amarillo Jan. 29, 2009, orig. proceeding).

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Jury for Five Days, Bench for Two

The appellate court affirmed a 79%/21% division of the community estate rendered after a five-day jury trial followed by a two-day bench trial. This was a complex case involving constructive fraud, reimbursement, economic contribution and other issues. The opinion is authored by the El Paso court's Justice McClure who is well-known for her expertise in family law. Phillips v. Phillips, No. 08-06-00171-CV (Tex. App. - El Paso Mar. 26, 2009).

Courtesy of Verner & Brumley, P.C. Dallas, Texas